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Controlling Fraud Against The Government: The
Need for Decentralized Enforcement
Erwin Chemernsky *
The magnitude of fraud against the government demands seri-
ous and creative attention. It is estimated that the United States
treasury is cheated out of $25 to $70 billion a year.' Although it is
impossible to measure precisely the costs of graft, 2 study after study
has concluded that losses due to fraud and corruption are enormous. 3
In this era of budget austerity, it is imperative that effective action be
taken to recover misspent funds and to deter future fraud. Each dol-
lar lost through corruption is one dollar less that can be spent con-
structively. Such losses must be met either by decreasing the
availability of benefits or by raising taxes to pay for the higher costs.
Fraud in federal programs ultimately may diminish public support
for the programs and cause useful programs to be reduced because
they are perceived as little more than an opportunity for illicit
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.S., 1975, Northwestern University;
J.D., 1978, Harvard University. I want to thank Joan Colen for her excellent research assist-
ance. I also wish to thank Wayne Lewis and Marcy Strauss for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this article.
1 Chicago Tribune, Jan. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 1. As the term "fraud" is used throughout
this article, it refers to three types of government losses.. "Program fraud" involves fraud
against the government in its provision of benefits to individuals, businesses, and other levels
of government. For example, included within the concept of program fraud are losses suf-
fered by the Department of Health and Human Services in its administration of benefit pro-
grams. See Fraud, Abue, Waste, and Mismanagement of Programs by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm.
on GovernmentalAFairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978) (estimating losses of $7.4 billion in tax-
payer funds through fraud, abuse, and waste in benefit programs).
Second, the term "fraud" includes contract fraud which occurs when the government is
cheated in its contracts for property, services, and materials. See A. BEQUAI, WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME: A 20TH CENTURY CRISIS 67-71 (1978). Finally, "fraud" includes the receipt of
bribes and kickbacks by government employees and agents. Id. at 44-45.
2 Chicago Sun Times, May 8, 1981, at 34, col. 2 (quoting the General Accounting Of-
fice: "Actual losses due to fraud and other illegal activities will never be known because most
go undetected"). See also Heymann, White Collar Crime Symposium Introduction, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 271, 272 (1980).
3 See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (1978) (estimating that
one to ten percent of federal funds in programs such as Medicaid, food stamps, and Defense
Department spending is lost through fraud); Chicago Tribune, Jan. 18, 1981, at 10, col. 5
(quoting a 1980 study by the Republican Study Committee that $34 billion in fraud can be
saved; also quoting estimates of fraud ranging from $51 billion to $77 billion a year).
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In 1981, the United States General Accounting Office released a
report concluding that current efforts to control fraud are insufficient
to address the magnitude of the problem. 5 The report concluded
that the centralization of enforcement authority in the United States
Department of Justice results in relatively few criminal or civil cases
against fraud.6 The General Accounting Office proposed that a stat-
ute be enacted to permit federal agencies to impose monetary penal-
ties against those engaging in fraud against the government.7 In
October 1981, Senator William Roth introduced the "Program
Fraud Civil Penalties Act of 1981," Senate Bill 1780, which would
enact the General Accounting Office's recommendations. 8
Section one of this article examines why such decentralization of
enforcement is essential to combat fraud and corruption against the
government. Senator Roth's bill, however, at best offers only a lim-
ited attempt to decentralize enforcement. Under the bill, the Justice
Department retains control over an agency's ability to commence ad-
ministrative proceedings. 9 Even though the proposed statute is in-
spired by the Justice Department's failure to initiate adequate
litigation, the bill allows the Justice Department to retain its sole
authority to pursue court remedies.'0 There is a need for even
greater decentralization of enforcement authority against fraud and
corruption than this bill offers. The traditional assumption that only
the Justice Department should represent the United States in court
does not hold true in this area.II Rather than creating a new admin-
4 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL AGENCIES CAN AND SHOULD DO
MORE TO COMBAT FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 6 (Report to Congress by the
Comptroller General of the United States 1978) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL AGENCIES].
5 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS,
How EXTENSIVE IS IT, How CAN IT BE CONTROLLED (Report to Congress by the Comp-
troller General of the United States 1981)[hereinafter cited as FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMS].
6 Id. See also text accompanying notes 30-36 infra.
7 FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 5.
8 Program Civil Fraud Act of 1981, S. 1780, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc.
S12,226-28 (1981).
9 Section 806 of S. 1780 provides that for the agency to initiate administrative proceed-
ings, the agency head must notify the Attorney General and either receive direct approval or
wait 120 days for the Justice Department to disapprove such proceedings.
10 The statute contains no authority for agencies to initiate legislation. Even collection of
agency-imposed penalties requires the Attorney General to initiate proceedings in federal
court. S. 1780, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 805(a) (1981) ("Any penalty or assessment imposed in a
determination which has become final pursuant to section 803(g) of this chapter may be
recovered in a civil proceeding brought by the Attorney General.").
11 See text accompanying notes 59-73 in/a.
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istrative procedure against fraud, it would be preferable to allow
agencies in instances of major fraud to go directly to court for their
remedy. 12 Furthermore, an effective program to counter corruption
should include authority for taxpayers to bring civil suits on behalf of
the government to recover funds lost through fraud.' 3
Accordingly, section two of this article considers why legislation
should go even further than the Roth bill and provide authority for
both agencies and citizens to sue to recoup money for the United
States treasury. Finally, section three attempts to answer the poten-
tial objections to such a legislative proposal, arguing that decentral-
ized enforcement against fraud can result in major savings for the
government with minimal cost.
I. The Need for Decentralized Enforcement Authority Against
Fraud and Corruption
The primary purpose of Senator Roth's pending legislation is to
permit administrative agencies to take direct action to recover money
lost through fraud and corruption. Under the proposed statute,
agencies may conduct administrative proceedings against persons ac-
cused of defrauding the government. Agencies are given authority to
order those who have cheated the United States to pay back twice
the amount of their illicit gain plus $10,000 for each false claim or
statement made to the government.' 4 This legislation, if enacted,
would be a marked change from current policies; it emphasizes civil
penalties and would give each federal agency some potential author-
ity' 5 to act on its own against graft. As such, the proposed statute
12 See text accompanying notes 74-92 in/ia.
13 See text accompanying notes 93-120 infra. For a detailed description of a proposed
statute to create taxpayer authority to sue on behalf of the government to recover money in
instances of fraud and corruption, see Chemerinsky, Fraud and Cormption Against the Government:
A Proposed Statute to Establish a Taxpayer Remedy, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1482, 1512-21
(1981). As used herein, I refer to suits by private individuals on behalf of the United States as
"citizen suits." However, the statute which creates authority for citizen suits should probably
limit actions to those brought by taxpayers because taxpayers could more easily claim to have
an "injury in fact" which is required for standing in an Article III court. Id. at 1495 n. 106,
1513-14. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity, I will refer to all such litigation as "citizen
suits" throughout this article.
14 Section 803 of S. 1780 provides for administrative proceedings, § 803(b)(1), to recover
"the amount of damages suffered by the United States as a result of the false claim or state-
ment creating such liability," § 803(b)(1), and to impose penalties against those found to
have defrauded the government, § 803(b)(1)(B).
15 The agencies only have potential authority under the proposed bill because they cannot
initiate administrative proceedings if the Attorney General disapproves. S. 1780, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 806(a)(1981).
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seeks to correct the major defects in the current enforcement mecha-
nism: over-reliance on criminal sanctions and the inevitable insuffi-
ciency of the Justice Department's prosecutorial resources.
A. The Inadequay of Current Enforcement Efforts
Under the present system, virtually the entire responsibility for
combatting fraud against the federal government rests with the
United States Department of Justice.' 6 Fraud cannot be effectively
controlled, however, with purely criminal sanctions I7 or so long as
only one government agency can act against it. Senator Roth's pro-
posed statute supplements criminal prosecutions by allowing agen-
cies to conduct civil proceedings and to recover both the amount lost
by the government and substantial civil penalties. 18
Civil proceedings against fraud are needed because criminal ac-
tions are inadequate by themselves. In most criminal cases against
fraud, the penalties imposed are so small that they provide little de-
terrent effect. 19 Jail sentences are rarely imposed.20 For example, in
one study of 40,000 cases of fraud uncovered by investigators in the
Medicaid program, only 220 were successfully prosecuted and only
thirty-seven offenders were sentenced to prison terms.2 1 Another
study examined sentencing practices by judges in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia in fraud and corruption
cases over a three year period.2 2 In only twenty-four percent of the
cases was a prison term with a maximum jail sentence of three years
imposed, and in a quarter of these cases the judge reduced the
16 FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 5 (current efforts to control fraud are
primarily directed to filing criminal and civil actions by the Department of Justice).
17 LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, FRAUD AND ABUSE IN GOVERN-
MENT BENEFIT PROGRAMS 89 (1979) (noting that the government traditionally "has placed
heavy reliance on the criminal justice system as its main line defense in combatting program
fraud and abuse") [hereinafter cited as FRAUD AND ABUSE].
18 The agency is entitled to recover double the amount lost by the government plus a
penalty of $10,000 for each false statement or claim made to the government. S. 1780, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 802(b)(1) (1981).
19 Ogren, The Inefectiveness ofthe Criminal Sanction in Fraud and Corruption Cases: Losing the
Battle Against White Collar Crime, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 959, 960-69 (1973).
20 W. SEYMOUR, WHY JUSTICE FAILS 45-46 (1973); LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 208 (1979).
21 A. BEQUAI, supra note 1, at 70. Bequai offers an example involving two physicians
found guilty of submitting false claims in the Medicaid program. Although these doctors
could have been sentenced to 205 years in prison, they were given suspended sentences. Id. at
71.
22 Ogren, supra note 19, at 962.
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sentence. 23
Furthermore, civil actions are needed because criminal sanctions
do not require the defendant to repay the money fraudulently
gained.24 Even when the Justice Department initiates criminal pros-
ecutions, separate actions are necessary to recoup the lost funds for
the agency. Nor are the monetary penalties imposed in criminal
cases sufficient to recover the illicitly earned funds. In most cases the
perpetrator gains "more financially from its crimes than it pays in a
fine if convicted." 25
In fact, even if criminal actions did recoup the lost funds, there
would still remain many situations in which civil recovery proceed-
ings would be preferable. 26 For example, in criminal cases, guilt
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas in civil actions
liability can be established by a preponderance of the evidence. In
criminal prosecutions, the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination permits the defendant to refuse to testify and prevents
any adverse inference to be drawn from the defendant's silence. By
contrast, in civil proceedings the fifth amendment does not forbid
adverse inferences against a party who refuses to testify in response to
probative evidence. 27 Furthermore, the scope of discovery is much
23 It is very unlikely that the pattern of low sentences in cases of fraud and corruption
will change in the foreseeable future. As Professor Conklin explains,
One [reason for the lenient treatment of white collar criminals] is the high degree of
cultural homogeneity among the defendants, the legislators who pass the laws regu-
lating businessmen, and the judges who determine guilt and mete out sentences to
violators of those laws. Because businessmen, lawmakers, and judges come from
similar social backgrounds, are ofsimilar age, have often been educated at the same
universities, associate with the same people, and have similar outlooks on the world,
it is not surprising that legislators and judges are unwilling to treat business offend-
ers harshly.
J.E. CONKLIN, "ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL": BUSINESS CRIMES IN AMERICA 112 (1977).
24 See Ogren, supra note 19, at 979-81.
25 J.E. CONKLIN, supra note 23, at 103. See also Ogren, supra note 19, at 968.
26 S generally Goldschmid, An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use ofCivil Mon
, 
Penal-
ties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, 2 ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. 896 (1973);
Kovel, A Cae for Civil Penalties: Air Pollution Control, 46 J. URB. L. 153, 156-58 (1968). In fact,
in some instances civil remedies might be more desirable than criminal prosecutions. See H.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 361-62 (1968):
Where economic gain is the motive for the infraction and where the ability to im-
pose significant economic deprivation on the offender exists, it may well be ques-
tioned whether the criminal sanction's contribution offers value equivalent to cost.
To impose criminal standards of procedure and criminal criteria of proof for the
end result of nothing more than a financial exaction may well be to pay a higher
social cost than is necessary. Indeed, the conventional monetary fine structure of
the criminal sanction may limit the deprivation far beyond what would be possible
with a more flexible public or private damage action.
27 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATFORNEYS GENERAL, THE USE OF CIVIL REMEDIES IN
[Vol. 58:995]
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broader in civil cases than it is in criminal prosecutions.28 Expansive
discovery can greatly aid the detection and investigation of fraud,
providing a powerful tool for uncovering corruption. Additionally,
civil proceedings are often advantageous because they permit the
government to appeal a verdict for the defendant, which the govern-
ment may not do if it loses in a criminal action.2 9 Of course, this is
not meant to suggest that criminal prosecutions are uniformly unde-
sirable or should be avoided in cases of fraud and corruption.
Rather, the point is that civil proceedings can play an important and
unique role in combatting such illicit activity. The proposed legisla-
tion is desirable in that it provides much-needed additional authority
for civil actions against fraud.
Second, in addition to the over-reliance on criminal prosecu-
tions, current efforts to control fraud are inadequate because of the
inherent insufficiency of the Justice Department's resources. The
Government Accounting Office study revealed that the Justice De-
partment prosecutes relatively few fraud cases. 30 In even fewer in-
stances does the Justice Department initiate a civil suit to recoup the
lost funds or impose monetary penalties on perpetrators of fraud.3 '
The Government Accounting Office found that of 393 cases referred
by agencies to the Justice Department for the commencement of a
civil fraud suit, only twenty-eight actions were filed in court.32
The complexity of litigation against corruption means that these
cases "entail an enormous expenditure of. . . resources in relation to
the number of cases prosecuted"; hence "comparatively few" are pur-
sued. 33 In fact, even if Justice Department resources were increased,
prosecutors still would be able to deal with only a small fraction of
the potential fraud and corruption cases. 34 Charles Ruff, former
Watergate Special Prosecutor and Assistant Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, observed:
ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL 3 (rev. ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL REMEDIES]. See
generally Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle-The Fftih Amendment 'vilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L.J.
1062 (1982).
28 CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 27, at 8.
29 See generally Comment, Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Illegality, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 40, 43 n.28 (1978).
30 FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 5.
31 Id. An earlier study by the General Accounting Office revealed that the total amount
of all Justice Department civil suits against fraud was only $250 million, an amount that even
Justice Department officials conceded "is only a fraction of the amount defrauded the govern-
ment." FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 4, at ii.
32 FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 5.
33 Ogren, supra note 19, at 960.
34 A. BEQUAI, supra note 1, at 150; Ogren, supra note 19, at 973.
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I think it is clear that we have to recognize. that criminal prose-
cutions simply cannot be the answer to this problem. We cannot
deal with anything much more than a small percentage of the loss
that occurs through fraud, abuse and waste, by criminal prosecu-
tions, nor do we realistically have the resources to detect, through
law enforcement personnel, those losses.
35
Centralized enforcement authority means that if the Justice Depart-
ment chooses to make fraud prosecutions a low priority, little will be
done to stop graft and corruption.36 And even if the Justice Depart-
ment chooses to invest heavily in trying to stop fraud, it has the re-
sources to handle only relatively few cases.
Accordingly, centralized enforcement authority insures not only
that little of the money lost through fraud will be recovered, but also
that deterrence of future corruption will be minimal. Deterrence de-
pends on two factors: the likelihood of punishment 37 and the magni-
tude of the penalties imposed.38 Because limited resources mean that
few cases will be prosecuted by the Justice Department, there is little
to deter perpetrators of fraud.3 9 Moreover, when actions are pursued
the penalties are so small as to obviate an adequate deterrent effect.
4 0
Centralized enforcement authority can never adequately control the
vast fraud that exists in government programs.
B. Decentralizing Enforcement Against Fraud- S 1780
Currently, the False Claims Act provides the primary statutory
authority for government actions against fraud.4 1 It was enacted by
Congress in 1863 in response to widespread fraud and corruption
during the Civil War.42 The Act imposes both criminal and civil
35 Fraud in overnment." Hearings Before the House of Representatives Task Force on Government
Efcieny of the Comm. on the Budget, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979) (testimony of Charles Ruff)
[hereinafter cited as Fraud in Government].
36 Ogren, supra note 19, at 960.
37 See N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CON-
TROL 255-61 (1970); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 3
(1976); F. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 1-2 (1971).
38 See K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 403-04 (1962); Geis, Deterring Corporate Crime, in
CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 182 (R. Nader and M. Green eds. 1972); Ogren, supra note
19, at 960.
39 FRAUD AND ABUSE, supra note 17, at 100-01; Ogren, supra note 19, at 960.
40 FRAUD AND ABUSE, supra note 17, at 100-01; Comment, supra note 29, at 46.
41 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1001 (1976); 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-233, 235 (1976), as amended by Act of
Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-582, § 1, 92 Stat. 2479 (1978). Sections 287 and 1001 are crimi-
nal provisions; sections 231-233 and section 235 provide for civil liability. For an excellent
discussion of the Act and its provisions, see Note, The Federal False Claims Act: A "Remedial"
Alternative for Protecting the Governmentfrom Fraudulent Practices, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 159 (1978).
42 False Claims Act of 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (originally codified at Rev. Stat.
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liability for the presentation of false claims. 43 Liability is created in
three instances: submission for payment or approval of false, ficti-
tious, or fraudulent claims against the United States government; use
of fraudulent or fictitious statements to obtain approval of a claim;
and conspiracies to obtain government payment of a false claim. 44
The Act provides for imposition of civil penalties; each person found
to have submitted false claims is liable to "forfeit and pay to the
United States the sum of $2,000, and, in addition, double the
amount of damages which the United States may have sustained by
reason of the doing or committing such act, together with the costs of
suit."'45 Although the False Claims Act has been recodified, the basic
statutory provisions remain almost exactly the same.4
The proposed statute, S. 1780, adopts many of the provisions of
the False Claims Act,47 but would change it in two significant ways.48
§§ 3490-94, 5438 (1874)). The Act was motivated by revelations of fraud by contractors sup-
plying materials for the Civil War effort and by reports of government officers receiving
bribes and kickbacks. The congressional debates over the False Claim Acts were not exten-
sive. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952-58 (1863).
43 False Claims Act of 1863, ch. 67, §§ 1-3, 12 Stat. 696 (originally codified at Rev. Stat.
§§ 3490, 5438 (1874)).
44 Revised Statutes § 5438 provided liability for:
Every person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to be
presented for payment or approval. . . any claim upon or against the Government
of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be
false, fictitious, or fraudulent, or who, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to
obtain the payment or approval of such claim, makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or
deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or
entry, or who enters into any agreement, combination, or conspiracy to defraud the
government. . . by obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or allowance of any
false or fraudulent claim[s] ....
Rev. Stat. § 5438 (1874).
45 Rev. Stat. § 3490 (1874).
46 The civil and criminal provisions have been reenacted into two separate statutes. The
criminal sections were slightly altered and became 18 U.S.C. § 287 and § 1001 (1976); the
civil provisions became 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976).
47 For example, the proposed statute would create a six year statute of limitations from
the time of the submission of the false claim. S. 1780, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 806(b)(1) (1981),
identical to that contained in the False Claims Act. Similarly, many of the definitions in the
bill are identical to those in the False Claims Act, set, e.g., S. 1780, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 801(b) (1981).
48 The proposed act does clarify other aspects of the False Claims Act. Most notably, the
Act resolves a current conflict among the federal courts of appeals by providing that the term
"knowingly" as used within the Act "means with reckless disregard for whether a claim or
statement is false." S. 1780, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 801(b)(2) (1981). Some circuits have held
that proof of an intent to defraud is necessary for recovery under the False Claims Act. See,
e.g., United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 122 (9th Cir. 1970). Other circuits have held that proof of a specific
[June 19831
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First, whereas the False Claims Act provides for recovery only upon
adjudication by a federal court, the pending legislation would permit
agencies to conduct administrative proceedings and determine liabil-
ity for submission of false claims.49 Second, while the bill continues
to allow the United States to recover double the amount of damages
sustained by the government, it increases the size of the monetary
penalty from $2,000 to $10,000 per false claim submitted. 50
These revisions in the False Claims Act would substantially alle-
viate the deficiencies in current enforcement mechanisms. Permit-
ting each agency to conduct enforcement proceedings would
eliminate the Justice Department's monopoly over enforcement, re-
sulting in significant increases in the number of actions brought
against fraud. Allowing agencies to recover double the amount of
the government's loss, plus a substantial penalty, 51 would insure that
perpetrators will not keep their ill-gotten profits. 52 Thus the pending
legislation should increase both the frequency of prosecutions and
the severity of punishments, and thereby better deter future fraud.
Although many states have interpreted their constitutions to for-
bid state administrative agencies from imposing such civil penal-
ties, 55 at the federal level it appears "well-settled that Congress has
the power to provide civil sanctions as an aid to effecting its purpose
. ..and, further, that it can delegate that power to administrative
agencies. '54 Recently, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
intent to defraud is unnecessary, and liability may be premised on reckless disregard for
whether a claim is false. See, e.g., United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d
47, 56-81 (8th Cir. 1973); Fleming v. United States, 336 F.2d 475, 479 (10th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 907 (1965).
49 S. 1780, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 803 (1981).
50 S. 1780, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 802(b)(1)(A) (1981) (providing for $10,000 penalty).
51 The $10,000 penalty is especially important because a single fraudulent scheme can
involve many separate false vouchers or invoices, each of which counts as a separate false
claim, and each of which warrants the imposition of a separate penalty of $10,000. See
United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976) (determining the number of false claims);
Gondelman, False Claim Against the Government: Defense Tactics in a False Claims Prosecution, 17
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 399, 402-03 (1980) (discussing United States v. Bornstein).
52 Goldschmid, supra note 26, at 946 ("Where improper profits have been made or other
pecuniary benefits derived, penalties should deprive the offender of more than his gain if they
are to prevent future violations.").
53 See, e.g., State v. Public Service Comm'n, 259 S.W. 445 (Mo. 1924); State ex rl. Lanier
v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161 (1968); Tite v. State Tax Comm'n, 89 Utah 404, 57
P.2d 734 (1936).
54 N.A. Woodworth Co. v. Kavanagh, 102 F. Supp. 9, 13-14 (E.D. Mich. 1952), a 'd, 202
F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1953) (affirming authority of the National War Labor Board to impose
civil penalties). See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v.
Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932); Elting v. North German Lloyd, 287 U.S. 324 (1932); Oceanic
Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
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Congress may delegate to an administrative agency the power to im-
pose a penalty of up to $10,000 for a violation of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act.55 Administratively imposed civil penalties,
such as contained in the pending legislation, are increasingly used
throughout the federal bureaucracies. 56
In sum, the proposed bill is a laudable step towards decentraliz-
ing enforcement authority against fraud and corruption. However, it
must be recognized that while the pending legislation would accom-
plish some decentralization, the Justice Department would remain to
a large extent in exclusive control of the government enforcement
efforts. The proposed act does not permit an agency to begin admin-
istrative proceedings to impose civil penalties without the consent of
the Attorney General.57 An agency cannot collect its own penalties,
but rather would have to rely on the Justice Department to bring
collection actions in federal district court. 58 In short, the bill, which
is premised on the Justice Department's inadequacies, allows the Jus-
tice Department to retain control of government efforts against
fraud. A more effective solution to fraud and corruption would be to
decentralize enforcement authority further than the Roth bill by per-
mitting agencies and citizens to sue in federal courts to recover
money for the United States.
55 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442
(1977).
56 Goldschmid, supra note 26, at 897, 903. The Administrative Conference of the United
States has recommended:
Increased use of civil money penalties is an important and salutary trend. When
civil money penalties are not available, agency administrators often voice frustra-
tion at having to render harsh "all or nothing decisions"..., sometimes adversely
affecting innocent third parties, in cases in which enforcement purposes could be
better served by a more precise measurement of culpability and a more flexible
response. In many areas of increased concern. . . availability of civil money penal-
ties might significantly enhance an agency's ability to achieve its statutory goals.
I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 191 (1978).
57 S. 1780, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 806(a) (1981).
58 S. 1780, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 805 (1981). The Justice Department's exclusive au-
thority to initiate litigation to collect judgments provides the Justice Department with the
ability to settle suits for far less than the amount of the penalty imposed by the agency.
Agencies are currently concerned that the Justice Department is settling fraud cases for far
too little money. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, March 16, 1983, at 20, col. 3 (NASA officials
angry that the Justice Department settled for only $1.5 million 'with the Rockwell Corp. for
illegally billing the space shuttle project for time that the employees actually spent working
on other projects).
[.June 19831
DECENTRALIZED FRAUD ENFORCEMENT
II. Aiding the Battle Against Fraud and Corruption:
Decentralizing Litigation Authority
In granting the Attorney General ultimate authority over all
government actions against fraud, Senator Roth's proposed legisla-
tion follows the customary practice of allowing the Justice Depart-
ment to control all litigation by the United States.59 In many
situations, however, such as civil actions against fraud and corrup-
tion, the traditional assumption of Justice Department hegemony
should be reconsidered. Exclusive Justice Department control is not
only unnecessary, but also counterproductive in providing an effec-
tive strategy for enforcement against fraud.
Three primary arguments are usually advanced to support the
Attorney General's control over all civil litigation by the United
States; none is applicable here. First, the Constitution 6° provides the
President with prosecutorial discretion which, it has been contended,
is best preserved by allowing the Justice Department to choose when
to initiate litigation.61 Yet it is clearly established that no constitu-
tional usurpation of presidential authority results when Congress al-
lows administrative agencies to possess independent enforcement
authority.62 More specifically, there is no reason why the Justice De-
59 Federal statutes provide the Attorney General with exclusive authority to litigate on
behalf of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1976) ("Except as otherwise authorized by
law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or an officer thereof is a
party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department
ofJustice, under the direction of the Attorney General."); 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1976) ("Except as
otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all litigation to which the
United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct all United States attor-
neys, assistant United States attorneys, and special attorneys . . . in the discharge of their
respective duties."). This exclusive authority has been interpreted to mean that administra-
tive agencies may not initiate court litigation or secure judicial remedies without the approval
of the Attorney General. See, e.g., I.C.C. v. Southern Ry., 543 F.2d 534, 537-38 (5th Cir.
1976) (denying the I.C.C. authority to obtain an injunction to enforce its order in federal
district court); In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 500 F. Supp. 1235, 1238-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying authority to the Federal Maritime Commission to intervene in
court proceedings without the approval of the Attomey General).
60 The United States Constitution provides that the President "shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 3. For an excellent discussion of the
meaning of this clause, see Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power of the President to Execute the Laws, 46
TENN. L. REV. 757 (1979).
61 The prosecutorial responsibility is considered an executive function. See United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1081-82 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975).
62 See, e.g., I.C.C. v. Chatsworth Coop. Mktg. Ass'n, 347 F.2d 821, 822 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965) (upholding the I.C.C.'s independent enforcement authority in
response to a challenge that it was an unconstitutional infringement upon the President's
constitutional powers). See also Ledewitz, supra note 60, at 783 ("The absence of constitu-
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partment should have the exclusive right to determine whether to
bring an action to recover government money lost through fraud.
The argument for preserving the Attorney General's sole
prosecutorial discretion in cases of fraud "appears to reflect a desire
to purposely avoid prosecution of some violations. ' 63 It is hard to
imagine a situation in which fraud against the government should
not be remedied, at least to the extent of recovering the illicitly
gained sum. In situations where the Justice Department chooses not
to exercise its prosecutorial discretion because of a shortage of re-
sources, there would be an obvious advantage to allowing others to
act on behalf of the government.6 And in those instances when
prosecutorial discretion is not exercised for corrupt or political rea-
sons, it is imperative that someone else be able to initiate proceedings
against the fraud.65 Because perpetrators of fraud should never be
allowed to keep their ill-gained profits, traditional considerations of
prosecutorial discretion have no applicability here.
Second, exclusive Justice Department control over litigation is
often urged as a way to insure coordination of government actions.
Given the size and varied activities of the United States government,
there is a real danger that agencies with independent litigating au-
thority could take contradictory positions on important questions of
public policy.66 Former Attorney General Griffin Bell noted that
permitting agencies to litigate on their own "can and sometimes does
result in two sets of government lawyers opposing each other at tax-
payer expense."'67 This fear, however, is groundless when dealing
with fraud and corruption because it is highly unlikely that one
agency would sue another for fraud. Prosecution of cases against
corruption does not involve the kinds of public policy questions that
require Justice Department coordination.
tional challenges to independent agency enforcement power is itself an indication that the
power of Congress to create independent law enforcement is accepted").
63 Comment, Qui Tam Actions: The Role of the ftiate Citizen in Law Enforcement, 20
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 778, 797 (1973).
64 Comment, Qui Tam Suits Under the Federal False Claims Act: Tool of the Private Litigant in
Public Actions, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 446, 471 n.130 (1972) (describing the desirability of citizen
suits against fraud to compensate for government shortages of prosecutorial resources).
65 Id. See also text accompanying notes 111-15 infta (value of citizen suits in situations
where otherwise no prosecution would occur).
66 L.A. HUSTON, A.S. MILLER, S. KRISLOV & R.G. DIXON, ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 64-65 (1968) [hereinafter cited as L.A. HUSTON]; A.G.
LANGELUTTIG, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 115-16 (1927); Bell,
The Attorney General- The Federal Covermnent5 Chief Lawyer and Chief Liigator, or One Among
Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1058 (1978).
67 Bell, supra note 66, at 1058.
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A related argument points out that permitting agencies or citi-
zens to sue on behalf of the United States might compromise a crimi-
nal prosecution being pursued by the Justice Department.6 This
danger, however, could be avoided by careful drafting of the legisla-
tion granting the agency or citizen litigating authority. 69 The statute
could authorize the Justice Department to assume control over the
litigation 70 or request the court to stay the civil case until after com-
pletion of the criminal proceeding? 1 Thus, the traditional argument
that there is a need for the Justice Department to coordinate enforce-
ment is inapplicable in the area of fraud where the emphasis is on
numerous separate, independent actions against perpetrators of
corruption.
The final argument advanced for allowing the Attorney General
to control all of the government's civil proceedings is the Justice De-
partment's expertise in litigation. 72 But there is no reason why agen-
cies cannot hire or train litigators to handle fraud cases. Even former
Attorney General Bell recognized the desirability of having non-Jus-
tice Department attorneys handle litigation initiated by agencies. 73
Furthermore, even if the Justice Department does have superior liti-
gators, it would seem preferable to have a fraud case brought by a
less experienced lawyer than to have no proceeding at all and allow
the corruption to go unremedied.
In sum, although in most situations there are strong reasons why
the Justice Department should have exclusive authority to represent
the United States in federal courts, these reasons are not applicable
in fraud and corruption cases. In fact, there are compelling reasons
why agencies and private citizens should be able to sue to recover
money for the government.
68 It is feared the independent litigation against fraud could compromise the Justice De-
partment's criminal prosecutions because discovery in civil cases is much broader than discov-
ery in criminal cases. The Justice Department fears that concurrent civil and criminal
litigation will jeopardize criminal prosecution because defendants will use civil discovery to
learn the details of the government's case. Comment, supra note 63, at 798.
69 For a suggestion of such statutory provisions, see Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1514-
15, 1520.
70 The statute should provide that if the Justice Department assumes control over a civil
suit and does not pursue it in good faith, the previous plaintiff who initiated the action should
be able to petition the district court to be reinstated as plaintiff. Id. at 1515; Comment, supra
note 64, at 457 n.22.
71 Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1514-15, 1520.
72 L.A. HUSTON, supra note 66, at 64-65; Bell, subra note 66, at 1062.
73 Bell, supra note 66, at 1062.
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A. The Need for Agency Litigating Author'ty
The proposed act, S. 1780, is premised on the Justice Depart-
ment's failure to adequately prosecute civil actions against fraud. 74
Yet, the act seeks to correct this not by permitting agencies to initiate
such suits, but rather by shifting cases from judicial to administrative
forums.75 For a number of reasons, it would be preferable to permit
agencies to commence civil litigation in federal courts under the
False Claims Act, at least in instances where the Justice Department
fails to do so. 76
First, federal court litigation rests on constitutionally sounder
ground than administrative proceedings against fraud. Currently, all
cases under the False Claims Act must be brought in federal courts,
but the pending legislation would permit agencies to determine lia-
bility in false claims cases through administrative proceedings. 77
Thus, the act proposes to substitute decisions by agency personnel 78
for those now made by federal article III judges. 79  While the
74 The proposed bill, S. 1780, would enact the recommendations of the General Account-
ing Office, supra note 3, which argued for administrative penalties in light of the inadequacy
of Justice Department efforts against fraud. See text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
75 The False Claims Act now makes no provision for administrative proceedings to re-
cover false claims. See 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976). Section 803 of S. 1780 would expressly provide
for administrative actions in false claims cases.
76 Other statutes provide authority for agencies to litigate in court when the Justice De-
partment fails to do so. For example, the Federal Trade Commission may commence, defend,
or intervene in civil judicial proceedings if the Justice Department does not act to control the
litigation. 15 U.S.C. § 56(a)(4) (1976). "Some thirty-one separate federal governmental units
have .. authority to conduct at least some of their own litigation." Bell, supra note 66, at
1057.
77 S. 1780, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 803 (1981).
78 Section 803 of S. 1780 provides:
(b)(1) The authority head shall conduct a hearing on the record regarding any
allegation referred to him pursuant to this section to determine-(A) whether a
person is liable under section 802(b) of this chapter; (B) the amount of damages
suffered by the United States as a result of the false claim or statement creating
such liability; and (C) the amount of any penalty and assessment to be imposed
upon such person.
Section 803(b)(2) provides for procedural due process in the form of written notice, right to
counsel, confrontation, and an opportunity to present evidence.
79 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensa-
tion, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Thus, article III courts are those created by Congress whose judges are given life tenure,
whose salary cannot be decreased, and who are assigned inherently judicial tasks. See Glid-
den Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). See generally M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
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Supreme Court has traditionally upheld Congress' authority to dele-
gate judicial duties to administrative agencies,80 the Court's recent
decision in Northem Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Poe Line Co. 81
raises new questions about the constitutionality of shifting from judi-
cial to administrative decisionmaking in fraud cases.
In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court considered the constitu-
tionality of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which created bank-
ruptcy judges with fourteen year terms to hear all claims arising in or
related to petitions for bankruptcy. 2 The Court held the Act uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it vested the judicial power in judges
who did not have the guarantee of life tenure required by article III
of the Constitution.8 3 The plurality stated that non-article III courts
are permitted only in limited circumstances.8 4 One of the situations
in which they are allowed is cases "involving 'public rights,'.., suits
between the government and others."8 5
The Court's reasoning, however, raises doubts about whether
fraud cases come within the definition of "public rights" cases. The
Court stated that administrative agencies could replace article III
ALLOCATIONS IN THE TENSIONS OF ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 35-51 (1980) (discuss-
ing the difference between article I and article III courts).
80 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (approving power of administrative
agency to decide workmen's compensation cases); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Im-provement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855). The Court in Murray's Lessee stated:
At the same time these are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented
in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are
susceptible of judicial determination, but which Congress may or may not bring
within the cognizance of the Courts of the United States as it may deem proper.
Id.
81 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982) (plurality opinion).
82 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-160, 771-775, 1471-1482 (Supp. III 1979). The Bankruptcy Act cre-
ates bankruptcy judges who are appointed to office for 14-year terms by the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate. 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153(a)(Supp. III 1979). The Act
grants the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over all "civil proceedings arising under Title I I or
arising in or relating to cases under Title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. III 1979). For an
excellent discussion of the unconstitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act, see Krattenmaker, Arti-
cle III andJudicial Independence: Why the New Bankrupty Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J.
297 (1981); Note, Article III Limits on Article I Courts.- The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court
and the 1979 Magistrate Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 560 (1980).
83 102 S. Ct. at 2879 (holding the bankruptcy courts unconstitutional as an impermissi-
ble assignment of the judicial power to non-article III courts).
84 Although the Court concluded that "the judicial power of the United States must be
exercised by tribunals having the attributes prescribed in Art. III," 102 S. Ct. at 2865, the
Court recognized three situations in which Congress may create legislative courts: courts to
govern the territories, see American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828); military
courts, see Dynes v. Hoover, 63 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858); and courts to adjudicate cases
involving public rights, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 102 S. Ct. at 2868-69.
85 102 S. Ct. at 2869-70.
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courts in public rights cases only in matters that traditionally have
not been reserved for judicial determination.8 6 It explained that the
authority for non-article III courts to decide public rights cases is
based on the "principle of sovereign immunity, which recognizes that
the government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued. '8 7
Since the United States may be sued only if it consents, the govern-
ment may limit its agreement to those suits litigated before non-arti-
cle III judges. Cases involving fraud and corruption, however,
always have been litigated in article III courts, and it is the United
States, not the private party, who is the plaintiff.
Even if Northern Pipeline is not extended to prevent Congress
from shifting false claims cases to non-article III forums, the case of-
fers reasons why article III courts provide a constitutionally superior
decisionmaking process. In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court em-
phasized the desirability of keeping the judicial function separate
from the executive or legislative branches.8 8 Yet permitting agencies
to decide false claims cases allows administrative bodies to serve as
judge as well as prosecutor. A private party sued by the agency
would be better assured of independent decisionmaking if the case
was heard, as it is now, in an article III court.
In fact, apart from separation of power considerations, there are
strong reasons to doubt the fairness of agency proceedings to recover
false claims. The proposed act would permit the agency head to hear
and decide such cases.8 9 It is questionable whether the agency head
86 Id. at 2870.
87 Id. at 2869.
88 The Court stated:
To ensure against such tyranny, the Framers provided that the Federal Govern-
ment would consist of three distinct branches, each to exercise one of the govern-
mental powers recognized by the Framers as inherently distinct. . . .The Federal
judiciary was therefore designed by the Framers to stand independent of the Execu-
tive and Legislature-to maintain the checks and balances of the constitutional
structure, and also to guarantee that the process of adjudication itself remained
impartial.
102 S. Ct. at 2864.
The proposed act, S. 1780, provides for judicial review of agency determinations in arti-
cle III courts in § 804(a): "Any person who has been determined pursuant to section 803 of
this chapter to be liable. . . may obtain review of such determination in the United States
Court of Appeals for the circuit in which such person resides or in which the claim or state-
ment ...was made, presented, or submitted .... ." Section 804(b) limits such review to
determining whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence. The
Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline explicitly concluded that such limited judicial review is
insufficient to insure adequate preservation of separation of powers. 102 S. Ct. at 2874-79.
89 S. 1780, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 803 (1981)(authorizing the "authority head" to con-
duct a hearing and determine liability).
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would provide impartiality, especially in instances where the agency
stands to profit from the recovery of the illicit sums.9° At the very
least, permitting agencies to sue in article III courts would provide
far greater assurances of the appearance of impartiality and fairness.
By contrast, there is no reason not to allow agencies to com-
mence litigation against fraud. The traditional reasons for relying on
administrative rather than judicial bodies, expertise and efficiency, 91
are not present here. Courts, rather than agencies, possess the experi-
ence in deciding false claims cases. In fact, deciding cases is by defi-
nition a judicial function, not a typical administrative responsibility
where the agency is asked to implement a legislative program.9 2
Thus, while much of the proposed legislation, S. 1780, is laudable, a
superior alternative would be to permit agencies to sue perpetrators
of frauds in federal courts to recover money for the government.
B. The Need for Citizen Suits Against Fraud and Corruption
Although the pending bill would somewhat expand the role of
agencies in enforcement proceedings against fraud, it would essen-
tially retain all prosecutorial authority in the hands of government
officers. To be most effective, legislation should confer authority on
private citizens to bring civil suits on behalf of the government to
recover money lost through fraud and corruption. 93 Control of graft
can best be achieved by this complete decentralization of enforce-
ment authority.
Allowing private citizen suits to aid in the enforcement of fed-
90 Senate Bill 1780 is unclear as to whether the agency will receive the money which it
recovers through administrative proceedings against perpetrators of fraud. Returning the
money to the agency budget would be desirable because it would allow the money to be spent
as Congress intended and it would give the agencies an incentive to initiate proceedings
against fraud. The problem is that if the agency will benefit monetarily, then the agency
head has a clear incentive for finding liability. Such a financial interest in the outcome of
proceedings would violate due process. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (invalidating
a scheme whereby the judge received funds from traffic violator's fines); B. SCHWARrL, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAw 304 (1976). In fact, even if the proceeds recovered are not returned to the
agency, there is still reason to question the impartiality of the agency head. See Calamari, The
Aftermath of Gonzalez and Home on the Administrative Debarment and Suspension of Government Con-
tractors, 17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1137, 1139-40 (1982) ("[I]t has been suggested that debarment
or suspension determinations made by agency heads involved in daily agency business suffer
from a lack of impartiality.").
91 See generally S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 10-35 (1978).
92 See Stewart, The Reformation of Ameriean Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669,
1675 (1975) (describing the traditional agency role as serving as a "transmission belt" to im-
plement legislative policy choices).
93 'This proposal is detailed in Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1512-21.
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eral laws is hardly novel. For example, the federal antitrust laws ex-
plicitly authorize private citizens to sue to enjoin antitrust violations
and recover damages for injuries. 94 The Supreme Court has praised
such authority for private suits because it "stimulates one set of pri-
vate interest[s] to combat transgressions by another without resort to
governmental enforcement agencies. Such remedies have the advan-
tage of putting back of such statutes a strong and reliable motive for
enforcement which relieves the government of the cost of enforce-
ment. '95 Similarly, citizens are allowed to sue to enforce the an-
tifraud provisions of the federal securities acts.9 6 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained the desirability of
such suits:
There are compelling reasons why the courts have been particularly
willing to recognize private rights of action under the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws. . . . [T]he SEC-the
agency charged with enforcement and administration of the federal
securities laws--does not have sufficient resources alone to enforce
many provisions of the statutes. Absent judicial recognition of pri-
vate rights of action, the federal securities laws most assuredly
would fail to provide the effective regulation over the securities in-
dustry which Congress intended.9 7
There are many other areas, as well, where Congress has authorized
citizen suits as a way to improve enforcement of federal laws.98
94 The Clayton Act provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) (authorizing private suits for
injunctive relief).
95 Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947) (authorizing pri-
vate suit under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a (1976)). But see Nashville
Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958) (denying a private right of action to enforce
the Robinson-Patman Act). Courts repeatedly have sustained private rights of action to en-
force the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976). See, e.g., Flinkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368,
398 (9th Cir. 1957) ("The private antitrust action is an important and effective method of
combatting unlawful and destructive business practices. The private suitor complements the
Government in enforcing the antitrust laws."); Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 4 (7th Cir. 1943)
("This grant to person damaged-a cause of action for treble damages-was for the purpose
of multiplying the agencies which could help enforce the Act and therefore make it more
effective."). Private actions to enforce the antitrust laws have increased in recent years. ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 1, MERGERS AND THE PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUIT:
THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT 44 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as ABA ANTITRUST SECTION].
96 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1976).
97 Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 872 (2d Cir. 1978).
98 See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. III 1979); Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-05e (1976); Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411, 413 (1976).
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There is substantial precedent for allowing citizen suits to re-
cover money for the government in cases of fraud and corruption. In
England during the Middle Ages, a shortage of law enforcement of-
ficers was offset by authorizing prosecutions by private litigants. 99
These suits, termed "qui tam" actions,100 were designed "to supple-
ment England's insufficient legal machinery in order to bring more
offenses to the cognizance of the courts."101 Private litigants, without
the prior approval of the government, were authorized to sue on be-
half of the Crown and recover a portion of the penalty imposed. 10 2
Similarly, in the United States during the Civil War, Congress
enacted legislation to allow citizens to enforce the False Claims
Act. 10 3 Concerned about the magnitude of corruption within the
government, Congress authorized private citizens to sue federal offi-
cials alleged to have committed fraud, and permitted successful
plaintiffs to receive a percentage of the amount recovered. 10 4 The
Act's legislative history indicates that "Congress chose to permit en-
forcement by private citizens, as well as by the government, because
of a belief that public officials, many of whom were deeply involved
in the corrupt practices complained of during the Civil War era,
would fail to initiate actions for reasons of selfish advantage."' 1 5 Al-
though the federal authority for qui tam suits has been almost com-
pletely repealed, 1 6 many states continue to permit such citizen-
99 Comment,supra note 64, at 451 n.21; Note, The Qui Tam Doctrine: A Comparative Anaysis
of its Application in the United States and the British Commonwealth, 7 TEx. INT'L L.J. 415, 418
(1972).
100 The term "qui tam" comes from the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam
quo se imposo sequitur," meaning, "who brings the action as well for the king as for himself."
Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Paper's, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302,
305 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
101 Note, supra note 99, at 417.
102 One commentator has explained:
Under [qui tam] statutes, financial incentives were provided, the purpose of which
was to create and keep active a vast number of "voluntary policemen", who were to
be paid on the results achieved by their own zeal and enterprise. . . . It was hoped
that they would be of great assistance in the administration of criminal justice,
solely because of the spur provided by the offer of reward.
2 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
FROM 1750, at 146 (1957). Parliament repealed authority for qui tam suits in 1951. Com-
mon Informers Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 39. In large part, such suits were eliminated
because law enforcement efforts were increasingly effective, making citizen actions unneces-
sary. Comment, supra note 63, at 779.
103 False Claims Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 696 (originally codified at Rev. Stat. §§ 3490-3494
(1874)). Authority for citizen suits was found in Rev. Stat. § 3491.
104 Rev. Stat. § 3491 (1874).
105 Comment, supra note 64, at 453 n.32.
106 Congress amended the False Claims Act to provide that: "The court shall have no
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
initiated litigation. 107
Decentralized enforcement through citizen-initiated civil litiga-
tion is desirable even if agencies also are granted authority to sue in
cases of fraud and corruption. First, citizens can supplement govern-
ment prosecutions by bringing civil suits in cases where no action
otherwise would be taken. Because agencies necessarily will have
only limited resources to devote to investigating and prosecuting
fraud,108 it is unrealistic to believe that agencies could afford to initi-
ate actions in all major cases of fraud. Allowing citizen suits would
subject perpetrators of fraud "to the prosecutorial resources not only
of the government but also of [private citizens]."10 9 The increase in
suits against fraud should enhance the deterrence of future unlawful
acts, as well as help redress past violations. 10
Second, authority for citizen suits is desirable as "insurance
against the instances in which the responsible prosecutors, usually
political officers, are themselves allied with the action challenged."'
In situations where there is corruption within the agency, private cit-
izens can initiate litigation when otherwise no enforcement would be
pursued. Such actions brought by private citizens would be espe-
cially useful where government officials are accused of receiving
bribes. 12 In states that permit taxpayer suits on behalf of the gov-
ernment, there are many successful examples of citizens suing to re-
cover money lost through fraud by state officials. 1 3 In one highly
jurisdiction to proceed with any such suit ... whenever it shall be made to appear that such
suit was based upon evidence or information in the possession of the United States or any
agency, officer, or employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought." 31 U.S.C. § 232(c)
(1976). The effect of the amendment is to create an almost absolute bar to citizen suits under
the False Claims Act. Comment, supra note 63, at 793-94.
107 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526(a) (West 1979); 19 GA. CODE ANN. § 64-104
(1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-17-3 (Burns 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-2907 (1977); N.Y.
STATE FIN. § 123 (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-10 (1981).
108 A. BEQUAI, supra note 1, at 150.
109 Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 371 (1972).
110 Note, Taxpayers' Actions." Public Invocation oftheJudia'y, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397,
399 n.16 (1977).
111 Note, Taxpayers'Suits: A Survey andSummaq, 69 YALE L.J. 895, 904 (1960) ("Taxpayers'
litigation seems designed to enable a large body of citizenry to challenge governmental action
which would otherwise go unchallenged"). It is also possible that agencies might not bring
actions against fraud because the prosecutions would reveal the agencies' incompetence in
devising administrative procedures.
112 Comment, Defending the Public Interest: Citizen Suits for Restitution Against Bribed Ojftials,
48 TENN. L. REV. 347, 347-48 (1981).
113 See, e.g., Munson v. Abbott, 602 S.W.2d 649 (Ark. 1980) (taxpayer suit to obtain resti-
tution of improperly spent public funds); Nelson v. Berry Petroleum Co., 242 Ark. 273, 413
S.W.2d 46 (1967) (taxpayer suit to recover more than $3 million which the state lost as a
result of a fraudulent scheme to fix prices for asphalt used in constructing state highways);
Richardson v. Blackburn, 41 Del. 54, 187 A.2d 823 (1963) (taxpayer suit to recover funds
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publicized case, Maryland taxpayers sued Spiro Agnew and forced
him to pay the state the amount of illegal bribes and kickbacks he
had received while governor of Maryland."14 In short, decentralizing
enforcement authority against fraud provides a desirable "means of
correcting illegal practices of government officials which would
otherwise be irreparable."' " 5
Finally, authority for citizen suits is desirable as a way to in-
crease the investigation of fraud. Private citizens often can discover
information that the government is unable to unearth. Many types
of fraud against the government are "consensual crimes" where there
is no victim directly injured by the criminal act." 6 In instances of
bribery, for example, there are willing parties who voluntarily par-
ticipate in the crime." 17 It is difficult for the government to detect
these types of offenses because no one comes forward to complain
about the illegality. Often, however, private citizens may be aware
of the scheme but lack any incentive to inform the government about
the fraud. Allowing citizen suits in which successful plaintiffs receive
a share of the recovery provides a strong incentive for individuals to
act on their knowledge. 118
Although litigation by private citizens acting on behalf of the
United States would be desirable, such suits are not currently al-
lowed. Restrictive doctrines limiting standing to sue in federal courts
preclude taxpayer or citizen actions in federal courts unless they are
explicitly authorized by a federal statute.'19 Currently, no law exists
to permit such litigation.' 20 Accordingly, legislation to combat fraud
and corruption in government should include provisions authorizing
both agencies and citizens to sue in federal court to recover money
for the United States.
III. Decentralizing Enforcement Authority Against Fraud:
Analyzing the Objections
My proposal is fairly simple: allow administrative agencies and
illegally paid to government employees); Wertz v. Shane, 216 Iowa 768, 249 N.W. 661 (1933)
(taxpayer suit to recover money illegally received by state legislators).
114 McMillen v. Agnew, Equity No. 23,638, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Md. 1982).
115 Note, supra note 111, at 910.
116 Comment, supra note 63, at 801.
117 Comment, supra note 64, at 451-52 n.23.
118 Qui tam actions frequently have been called "informers suits" because informers have
an economic incentive to come forward. Id. at 449 n.16.
119 For a discussion of the standing barrier to citizen or taxpayer actions against fraud, see
Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1500-05.
120 Id. at 1505-09.
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private citizens to sue in federal courts to enforce the False Claims
Act. The pending legislation, S. 1780, would be improved if it imple-
mented even greater decentralization of enforcement authority. Un-
doubtedly the Justice Department, which has argued that it alone
should prosecute, criminally and civilly, violations of federal law, 12'
would oppose such decentralization of prosecutorial powers. How-
ever, a close examination of the arguments against decentralization
reveals that each of the potential objections lacks merit.
The most likely objection to allowing citizens and agencies to
sue in federal court is that such litigation would deluge the courts,
exacerbating congestion in already over-crowded dockets. 122 At the
outset, it should be noted that this objection concedes that there are
many fraud cases not being prosecuted. Since courts can screen out
frivolous cases at an early stage in the proceedings, 23 a huge increase
in litigation could mean only that there is significant fraud which is
now being ignored. As such, the argument against permitting in-
creased suits must be based on the assumption that it is better to
allow fraud to go unremedied than it is to invest scarce judicial re-
sources in trying these cases. At the very least, additional court cases
are desirable when those actions more than pay for themselves. If
litigation yields a net profit for the Treasury, then it will subsidize
whatever judicial resources are invested in trying the cases. Neither
agencies nor private citizens have reason to bring suits against fraud
if recovery is unlikely. It is quite probable, therefore, that in a large
percentage of cases the government will recoup lost funds, and that
the benefits of such suits will almost certainly exceed the costs to the
judiciary.
There remains a legitimate concern that countless small fraud
121 See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 547 n.11 (1943).
122 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 130 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing for
restricting taxpayer standing on the ground that "public actions... may involve important
hazards for the continued effectiveness of the federal judiciary"); Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1971, at
1, col. 4.
123 David Berger stated,
It seems to me that the basic rationale of the opposing point of view rests on a
fundamental lack of confidence in the ability of federal judges to distinguish be-
tween a frivolous case, a meritorious case and one which is in between-a border-
line case. The remedy, I submit, is to get better federal judges, not to deny the right
of access to the courts to a private individual.
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 95, at 53. See also Citizens Right to Standing in Federal
Courts Act of 1978: Hearings on S 3005 Before the SenateJudiciag Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-
59 (1978) (dialogue between Senator Metzenbaum and Erwin Griswold). Furthermore, a
flood of frivolous suits is highly unlikely. See Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI.
L. REv. 601, 634 (1973).
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cases, each non-frivolous, might clog the courts. The appropriate so-
lution to this problem is not to bar all suits from the courts. Rather,
the simple answer is to require that a given amount be in contro-
versy. For example, the statute could rely on administrative proceed-
ings for cases involving less than $50,000, reserving court time for
major fraud litigation. 124
In short, the fear of court backlog is unwarranted when discuss-
ing fraud and corruption cases. Centralized enforcement authority
decreases court congestion only if the enforcement agency is bringing
an inadequate number of prosecutions.
A second potential objection to authorizing litigation by agen-
cies and citizens is that the suits will themselves become a source of
graft. Corrupt agency officials might commence litigation and agree
to end the proceedings in exchange for bribes or other favors. Simi-
larly, it is feared that taxpayers will file "strike suits," litigation initi-
ated for the sole purpose of coercing the defendant into a quick
settlement of the case rather than going through the expense of liti-
gating it. 125
The danger of corrupt agency action is a strong argument for
requiring agencies to sue in court rather than handling false claims
cases within administrative proceedings. Senator Roth's pending
legislation, which allows agencies to determine liability in fraud cases
in administrative actions, 2 6 presents the possibility that a corrupt
agency official could agree to settle the proceeding. With minimal
scrutiny outside the agency, it would be difficult to uncover such
fraud. By contrast, if agencies are required to sue in court, the judge
could review the dismissal of prosecutions and thereby reduce the
likelihood of corruption.
Similarly, individual strike suits can be made virtually impossi-
ble by including within the statute a provision preventing dismissal
without the consent of the judge and the United States government.
As explained earlier, a statute authorizing citizen suits should permit
the Attorney General to intervene to prevent any interference with
Justice Department prosecutions.' 2 7 The ability of the Justice De-
partment to intervene can assure that the interest of the United
124 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1514, 1520 (proposing a $50,000 amount in
controversy requirement for fraud suits brought by citizens or taxpayers).
125 Comment, supra note 63, at 797.
126 Section 803 of S. 1780 permits agencies to determine liability for the submission of
false claims to the government.
127 See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
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States will not be compromised through strike suits or improvident
settlements.
None of the potential objections to decentralizing enforcement
authority against fraud is insurmountable. Careful drafting of the
statutory authority for agencies and citizens to initiate civil litigation
can prevent the anticipated problems from occurring.
IV. Conclusion
An effective solution to a problem as great as fraud against the
government requires decentralized enforcement authority. The ar-
guments I have advanced might be extended to other areas, such as
environmental protection, where there are similar concerns-inade-
quate enforcement efforts and a problem so large its solution exceeds
any realistic commitment of government resources. At the very least,
however, one place to start rethinking traditional assumptions in
favor of centralized enforcement is in the area of government fraud
and corruption, where decentralized enforcement could make a ma-
jor difference in reducing illicit behavior and restoring confidence in
government programs.
[June 19831
